Written by Jessica Mason Pieklo for RH Reality Check. This diary is cross-posted; commenters wishing to engage directly with the author should do so at the original post.

The United States Supreme Court term begins in October, and while the entire docket has not yet been set, already it's shaping up to be a historic term, with decisions on abortion protests, legislative prayer, and affirmative action, just to name a few. Here are the key cases we're keeping an eye on as the term starts up.

1. Cline v. Oklahoma Coalition for Reproductive Justice

The Supreme Court looks poised to re-enter the abortion debate, and it could do so as early as this year if it takes up Cline, the first of the recent wave of state-level restrictions to reach the high court.

Cline involves a challenge to an Oklahoma statute that requires abortion-inducing drugs, including RU-486, to be administered strictly according to the specific Food and Drug Administration labeling despite the fact that new research and best practices make that labeling out of date. Such "off-label" use of drugs is both legal and widespread in the United States as science, standards of care, and clinical practice often supercede the original FDA label on a given drug. In the case of cancer drugs, for example, the American Cancer Society notes that "New uses for [many] drugs may have been found and there’s often medical evidence from research studies to support the new use [even though] the makers of the drugs have not put them through the formal, lengthy, and often costly process required by the FDA to officially approve the drug for new uses." Off-label use of RU-486 is based on the most recent scientific findings that suggest lower dosages of the drug and higher rates of effectiveness when administered in conjunction with a follow-up drug (Misoprostol). According to trial court findings, the alternative protocols are safer for women and more effective. But, according to the state and defenders of the law, there is great uncertainty about these off-label uses and their safety.

When the issue reached the supreme court of Oklahoma, the court held in a very brief opinion that the Oklahoma statute was facially invalid under Planned Parenthood v. Casey. In Casey, a plurality of justices held that a state may legitimately regulate abortions from the moment of gestation as long as that regulation does not impose an undue burden on a woman’s right to choose an abortion. Later, in Gonzales v. Carhart, a majority of the Supreme Court, led by Justice Anthony Kennedy, interpreted Casey to allow state restrictions on specific abortion procedures when the government "reasonably concludes" that there is medical uncertainty about the safety of the procedure and an alternative procedure is available.

Cline, then, could present an important test on the limits of Casey and whether, under Gonzales, the Court will permit states to ban medical abortions. But it's not entirely clear the Court will actually take up Cline. At the lower court proceedings, the challengers argued that the Oklahoma statute bars the use of RU-486’s follow-up drug (Misoprostol) as well as the use of Methotrexate to terminate an ectopic pregnancy. If so, the statute then bars both any drug-induced abortion and eliminates the preferred method for ending an ectopic pregnancy. Attorneys defending the restriction deny the law has those effects, and do not argue that if it did such restrictions would be constitutional. With this open question of state law—whether the statute prohibits the preferred treatment for ectopic pregnancies—the Supreme Court told the Oklahoma Supreme Court those disputed questions of state law.

So a lot depends on how the Oklahoma Supreme Court proceeds. Should the Oklahoma Supreme Court hold that the Oklahoma statute is unconstitutional because it prohibits the use of Misoprostol and Methotrexate, this case could be over without the Supreme Court weighing in. But if the Oklahoma Supreme Court invalidates the law insofar as it prohibits alternative methods for administering RU-486, the Supreme Court will almost certainly take a look.

2. Town of Greece v. Galloway

The Roberts Court is set to weigh in on the issue of when, and how, government prayer practices can exist without violating the Establishment Clause's ban on the intermingling of church and state. In Marsh v. Chambers, the Supreme Court upheld Nebraska's practice of opening each legislative session with a prayer, based largely on an unbroken tradition of that practice dating back to the framing of the Constitution. In Marsh, the Court adopted two apparent limits to a legislative prayer practice: The government may not select prayer-givers based on a discriminatory motive, and prayer opportunities may not be exploited to proselytize in favor of one religion or disparage another.

Prior to 1999, the town of Greece, New York, opened every legislative session with a moment of silence. Then, in 1999 and at the request of the town's supervisor, the town switched to opening its legislative sessions with a prayer. Nearly all of those prayers were delivered by Christian clergy members and, unlike other city councils, there was no requirement that the prayers be inclusive or non-denominational. City officials selected speakers off a list of local religious leaders provided by the Greece Chamber of Commerce. From 1999 through 2007, Christians delivered every single invocation prayer, in part because the list provided by the area Chamber of Commerce included only Christian religious officials despite the fact that other denominations exist in the community.

The practice was challenged by a group of citizens who argued it violated the Establishment Clause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit acknowledged that the Town of Greece had not violated either of Marsh’s limits in its practices, but still invalidated the town's practices. Applying the "reasonable observer" standard drawn from County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, the court concluded that a reasonable observer would view the town as endorsing Christianity over other religions, because its process of composing a list of prayer-givers from clergy within its geographic boundaries and volunteers virtually guaranteed the person delivering the prayer would be a Christian, because most of the prayers contained uniquely Christian references, and because prayer-givers invited participation and town officials participated in the prayers.

The reasonable observer test appears headed for a fall. In County of Alleghany, Justice Kennedy in his dissent criticized the reasonable observer test as insensitive to traditions and unworkable for governments and courts to apply. He argued that religious accommodations are consistent with the Establishment Clause as long as they do not coerce attendance at, or participation in, a religious observance, or directly fund religion. Justice Kennedy's perspective is an important one. To begin with, the makeup of the Court is different now than the last time it considered these issues. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor has been replaced by Justice Samuel Alito, for example, and the Court has veered hard to the right. It is conceivable then that the Court could view this case as an opportunity to abandon, or at least reconsider and revise, the reasonable observer test. If so, the decision could affect not only the constitutionality of legislative prayers, but also all religious accommodations, including the public display of religious symbols. It could also offer a glimpse into the Court's thinking on another religious accommodation likely to come before it this term: the challenges under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to the contraception benefit in the Affordable Care Act.

3. McCullen v. Coakley

Regardless of whether or not the Supreme Court ultimately takes up Cline v. Oklahoma Coalition for Reproductive Justice, the Court will take up the issue of abortion clinic protests in McCullen v. Coakley, a challenge that looks at the constitutionality of Massachusetts' clinic buffer zone law.

The last time the Supreme Court looked at the issue of clinic buffer zones was in Hill v. Colorado. In Hill, the Court held that a law limiting protest and "sidewalk counseling" within eight feet of a person entering a health-care facility in order to protect persons entering the facility from unwanted speech did not violate the First Amendment. Critical to the Court’s decision in Hill was its conclusion that the prohibition was content neutral because it arguably prevented both pro-choice and anti-choice speakers from entering the eight-foot zone.

The Massachusetts statute at issue in McCullen takes a different approach to get to the same purpose as the law upheld in Hill. The Massachusetts law prohibits anyone from entering a public sidewalk within 35 feet of a reproductive health-care facility, but exempts from that buffer employees of the facility acting within the scope of employment. The Massachusetts statute raises questions not resolved in Hill, including whether the employee exemption renders the Massachusetts statute content-based, meaning that it places a limitation on free speech depending on the subject matter, since arguably employees can use the exemption to deliver pro-choice messages. The Massachusetts statute differs in two other potentially significant differences also. First it applies only to reproductive health-care facilities, making its abortion-specific purpose more apparent, and has a larger buffer zone, making conversational speech more difficult.

Ultimately, this case may end up being more about whether the Supreme Court sympathizes with anti-abortion protestors rather than the differences between the Massachusetts statute and Hill. In Hill, the justices in the majority were especially sympathetic to the plight of patients who want to undergo a private medical procedure in peace, without being subjected to the emotional turmoil of confrontational protests. The dissenters in Hill now find themselves in the conservative majority under the Roberts Court, a fact that could drive the outcome here. In Hill, conservative justices like Antonin Scalia ignored the plight of patients and instead accused the majority of creating a special brand of reduced First Amendment protection for abortion protesters that would be viewed as intolerable if applied to any other speaker. And that perspective shift—from concerns over patients' rights to concerns over protesters' rights—could make all the difference in this case.

 

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Written by Mallika Dutt for RH Reality Check. This diary is cross-posted; commenters wishing to engage directly with the author should do so at the original post.

On Tuesday last week, I testified at a hearing of the Congressional Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations, entitled “Improving the Status and Equality of Women and Girls—Causes and Solutions to India’s Unequal Sex Ratio."

Gender-biased sex selection—the illegal misuse of medical technologies to determine the sex of a fetus in order to ensure a male child—has led to an alarming decline in the number of girls across India and elsewhere in the world. By some estimates, India is missing approximately 40 million girls. In the state of Haryana, there are only 832 girls for every 1,000 boys—a dramatically skewed ratio. This clear preference for sons is yet another manifestation of worldwide devaluing of women.

The problem requires an urgent and global response. So one might think that attention to son preference by the U.S. Foreign Relations Committee would be cause for celebration.

If only. The truth is that the people shaking their fists the hardest about the issue are actually those who are most hostile to women’s rights. Anti-abortion advocates have seized upon and rebuilt the issue as a Trojan horse for their own agenda. What they’re really trying to do? “Protect” women’s rights by denying women rights.

It is imperative that we stop gender-biased sex selection (GBSS). And it is imperative that we understand why we must stop it.

GBSS is a cultural practice driven precisely by devaluing and discrimination of women. Stopping it, therefore, is not about denying individual women their “choice.” It is about promoting the rights and worth of girls and women. What, after all, are the particular and age-old drivers of son preference? The view of girls as risks and burdens. Daughters are expensive—often requiring dowries, rarely able to bring in income. Daughters are “bad investments”—traditionally leaving their families for their husbands’ and not helping care for aging parents. Daughters are dangerous, inviting the risk of real assault or indiscretions that could besmirch family “honor.” Daughters are expendable.

So families have acted on son preference since long, long before the latest technologies facilitated, for a relatively small number of people, sex-selective pregnancy termination. Yet strangely, it is only when abortion enters the equation that certain individuals—like those I debated at the hearing—get interested in “saving” girls and women.

 

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Written by Erin Matson for RH Reality Check. This diary is cross-posted; commenters wishing to engage directly with the author should do so at the original post.

Recently, attorneys defending three former Naval Academy football players against allegations of sexual assault at an off-campus party spent more than 20 hours over five grueling days questioning, taunting, blaming, shaming, and what appears to be re-victimizing a 21-year-old female midshipman.

At one point, the midshipman said she was too exhausted to continue testifying and the commander presiding over the hearing granted her a day off. "This is borderline abusive," her attorney Susan Burke said upon leaving the Navy Yard that day. Abusive, yes, and sadly all too instructive in how rape culture encourages attorneys, members of the media, and others to turn sexual assault victims into the accused.

The routine process of victim blaming, as illuminated by this Article 32 hearing, serves to silence other sexual assault victims, generate sympathy for rapists, and create doubts that the definition of sexual assault includes anything beyond a stranger jumping out of an alley and raping a sweet, chaste woman wearing modest clothing.

In this case, the midshipman saw social media posts that led her to believe she was raped while drunk. All three defendants admitted sexual contact with the midshipman on the night at the center of the allegations—either to her, or prosecutors. What follows is a look at some of the horrible insinuations, statements, and questions used by defense attorneys to impugn the character of the midshipman, which offer an entry point to talk about and refute rape culture as a whole.

How do you perform oral sex?

Defense attorneys repeatedly asked the midshipman how she performs oral sex. This question is irrelevant, even though one of the defendants has said that he put his penis in her mouth that night. Here's the deal: It doesn't matter if a sexual assault victim has had sex, and it doesn't matter how she (or he) prefers to have sex. People are biologically driven to have sex. Sex is part of normal life. A history or manner of having oral sex, or rough sex, or any specific style of sex, does not mean that you can't be sexually assaulted orally, or roughly, or in that specific style. There are infinite ways to have sex, minus one: Sex without consent isn't sex. By definition, it's rape.

Tell us about your sex life.

Along with repeated queries about how she performs oral sex, the midshipman was asked to describe her sex life in detail. This, like the oral sex question, is also irrelevant and demeaning. Casting the spotlight on a victim's sexual history in the context of discussing her (or his) rape serves to make others imagine the victim sexually. It serves to degrade her (or him). Sharing your sexuality with others is a personal choice. Being cast in a sexual light can be highly desired, even great, when freely chosen. But painting a sexual picture of someone when they haven't asked you to serves to shame, silence, and sluttify.

You had sex with him before, right?

The midshipman and other witnesses were called to say that one of the defendants had a history of consensual sex with her prior to the night listed in the sexual assault charges. But this is irrelevant. There is no social role—boyfriend, girlfriend, husband, wife, best friend, casual sex partner, community leader, religious official—that renders a person unable to rape. The only way to not be a rapist is to not rape. Further, consent is never permanent. Consenting to sex once or even 1,000 times is never consenting to future sex. Consent must be given for every single sex act, every single time. Sexual contact without consent is sexual assault.

 

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Written by Jessica González-Rojas and Kimberly Inez McGuire for RH Reality Check. This diary is cross-posted; commenters wishing to engage directly with the author should do so at the original post.

If you’re reading this, it’s because we have just been arrested. On Thursday morning, we stood outside Congress as part of a group of 100 women leaders, and we demanded "salud, dignidad, y justicia"—health, dignity, and justice—for immigrant women. We called on the House of Representatives to take action on immigration reform that recognizes the contributions, and reflects the needs and experiences, of immigrant women and families.

For years, we at the National Latina Institute for Reproductive Health have been mobilizing Latinas to advance reproductive justice for immigrant women, and early this year we redoubled our organizing and advocacy on these critical issues. On Thursday, we took our efforts one step further, accepting the risks of arrest and separation from our families because we know Congress needs to wake up, listen, and act. We participated in this action because we can no longer stand by while some policymakers ignore the need for inclusive, comprehensive immigration reform with a roadmap to citizenship—and others like Rep. Steve King (R-IA) peddle tired, racist stereotypes and propose punishing restrictions on the health, success, and full integration of immigrant families into society.

By participating in an act of principled civil disobedience, we stand on the shoulders of leaders in women’s, civil, and human rights who have established a long and honored tradition of peaceful protest. This history includes many women, Latin@s, and people of color—people like the Puerto Ricans who protested the U.S. military presence in Culebra and Vieques, the women suffragists who were imprisoned for demanding a vote, and then force fed when they went on hunger strikes, and of course the legendary leaders of the U.S. civil rights movement like Rosa Parks and Dorothy Height. More recently, Latina DREAMers and immigrant advocates have led by example, engaging in civil disobedience and even infiltrating detention centers to call for compassionate, common sense immigration reform.

Today, we humbly add our names to these ranks, in hopes of helping to tip the scales toward justice.

 

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Written by Autumn Sandeen for RH Reality Check. This diary is cross-posted; commenters wishing to engage directly with the author should do so at the original post.

When I joined the U.S. Navy back in 1980, I knew I was transgender. I didn’t know the word transgender, but I knew deep down that's what I was.

Prior to joining the Navy, in 1979, my pentecostal parents considered transgender identities and transgender expressions to be sinful, and made going to "conversion therapy" a condition of living at home. Due to my own internalized transphobia, I thought I was sinful too, so I underwent the therapy, which had the goal of having me become "ex-transgender."

A goal of both gay and transgender conversion therapy is to embrace societal gender role norms, so in my case embracing masculine norms was the goal. It should come as no surprise then that when I enlisted in the Navy in 1980, it was in part an attempt to be the man I wasn't.

Chelsea Manning, who enlisted under the name Bradley Manning—and who in August received a 35-year prison sentence for releasing classified government documents to WikiLeaks—recently gave that same explanation as to why she enlisted.

If either of us had admitted to being transgender before we joined the military, we wouldn't have been allowed to join. This is because Department of Defense Instruction 6130.03, the Medical Standards for Appointment, Enlistment, or Induction in the Military Services, states that "[c]urrent or history of psychosexual conditions, including but not limited to transsexualism, exhibitionism, transvestism, voyeurism, and other paraphilias" precludes induction.

Department of Defense (DOD) policy also discharges currently serving personnel if they admit to, or are discovered to be, transgender. For enlisted service members, Department of Defense Instruction 1332.14 (the Enlisted Administrative Separations) is the controlling regulation. The Army's applicable regulation is Army Regulation 40–501, the Standards of Medical Fitness, which states:

A history of, or current manifestations of, personality disorders, disorders of impulse control not elsewhere classified, transvestism, voyeurism, other paraphilias, or factitious disorders, psychosexual conditions, transsexual, gender identity disorder to include major abnormalities or defects of the genitalia such as change of sex or a current attempt to change sex, hermaphroditism, pseudohermaphroditism, or pure gonadal dysgenesis or dysfunctional residuals from surgical correction of these conditions render an individual administratively unfit [to serve].

This transgender exclusion is backed by case law. The first such case in which such exclusion was discussed is 1981's Doe v. Alexander. Tarynn M. Witten wrote about the case in a 2007 whitepaper entitled "Gender Identity and the Military - Transgender, Transsexual, and Intersex Identified Individuals in the U.S. Armed Forces," saying:

[T]he Army defended its policy of denying enlistment to transsexual persons, arguing that transsexual persons presented a medical problem in that their requirements for hormone supplementation might not be available at some location where they could be assigned.

The 2007 DeGroat v. Townsend decision by the U.S. Southern District Court in Ohio, Western Division, echoed the decision in Doe v. Alexander, finding Joanne E. Degroat, a member of the U.S. Armed Forces (USAF) from 1974 to 1989, medically unfit to serve. In the decision, the court stated that "USAF medical staff encouraged and counseled her to dress in female street clothing when off-base and off-duty" as part of the treatment plan for her gender dysphoria. Major DeGroat was seen attending church in female clothing, and then "was notified that she had to show cause for retention on active duty for substandard performance due to a failure to show acceptable qualities of leadership required by an officer of her grade, based on her wearing female clothing on two instances and subjecting herself to public view." Her separation for service was upheld.

 

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Written by Kathryn Joyce for RH Reality Check. This diary is cross-posted; commenters wishing to engage directly with the author should do so at the original post.

This article was reported in partnership with The Investigative Fund at The Nation Institute and originally published in the September 16 issue of The Nation.

On May 1, a familiar anti-abortion story line played out on Azteca 13, a popular television channel in Mexico. In the opening scenes of an episode of Lo Que Callamos Las Mujeres (What We Women Keep Silent), a Lifetime-like telenovela series about “real-life” stories, a pretty brunette with a heart-shaped face, Alondra, discovers she is pregnant when overtaken by a sudden bout of morning sickness. Her sister Sofía is concerned, but later that night, when Alondra’s boorish boyfriend comes home and she breaks the news, he asks if it’s his, then tells her to abort.

Alondra complies and, in a series of hazy scenes, visits a clandestine abortion provider. But she’s haunted by what she has done, and is awoken at night by phantom baby cries that send her searching throughout her apartment until she collapses on the living room floor, her white pajama bottoms soaked through with blood. Her illegal abortion was botched, it turns out, and by terminating her pregnancy, a doctor tells her sister, she has forfeited her fertility as well. Some weeks later, Alondra’s boyfriend is accosted on the street by another woman, also pregnant by him, who begs him to acknowledge his future child. Sheepishly, he does, shrugging as he tells Alondra, “I’m going to be a papa,” before walking out the door to be with the other woman—the one who didn’t abort.

The message seems clear enough, but the story doesn’t end there. Two years later, when Alondra meets a good man who wants a family, she pushes the memory of the abortion out of her mind. In a state of manic delusion, she experiences a hysterical pregnancy, her belly swelling with her hopes, until Sofía forces her to see a doctor and Alondra breaks down, confronted with her unresolved grief. As Alondra again lies in a hospital bed, two years wiser and infinitely sadder, the doctor hands her a pamphlet. On its back cover, facing the camera, is the logo of the Instituto para la Rehabilitación de la Mujer y la Familia, or IRMA, a Mexican Catholic ministry that offers counseling for women suffering “post-abortion syndrome”—the medically unrecognized claim that terminating a pregnancy leads to serious psychological trauma.

The May episode of Lo Que Callamos was one of several instances in which IRMA was invited to suggest a “true-life” story line for the show, broadcasting to millions of viewers its message that abortion causes devastating harm to women and their families. One episode alone had generated some 200 calls and 400 emails to IRMA in a single day, said María del Carmen Alva López, IRMA’s president and founder, when I met her last October.

“They take a real story from us, a real history, and then at the end the lady goes to IRMA and receives help,” explained Alva, a cheerful 42-year-old with beauty-pageant poise. In a lush Mexico City suburb full of gated houses, Alva sat me down on a pleather loveseat in IRMA’s small, stucco-walled counseling room. The bookshelves outside were lined with copies of Alva’s book, Y después del aborto, ¿que? (And After the Abortion, What?), and in her hands she held a thick binder containing the results of a survey of 135 clients. Of these 135 “post-abortive” women, said Alva, her smile dimming and her eyes heavy with sympathy, IRMA estimates that 70 percent have clinical depression and 10 percent have attempted suicide. Results like these, she says, prove that post-abortion syndrome is real.

That these numbers are gathered from a self-selecting group of women who have sought out IRMA’s services doesn’t dampen Alva’s conviction that all Mexican women need to hear how abortion can hurt them. They especially need to hear it now, Alva believes. It’s been six years since first-trimester abortions were decriminalized in Mexico’s Distrito Federal, home to Mexico City, and more and more Mexican women are gradually learning about their limited right to choose—although abortion rights advocates fear this message hasn’t yet made its way to provincial, working-class women.

In this atmosphere, the claims about post-abortion syndrome and other supposed risks advanced by groups like IRMA are having real effects. According to Dr. Raffaela Schiavon, director of the Mexican chapter of the international abortion rights group Ipas and a former OB-GYN who served in Mexico’s Ministry of Health, a 2012 study suggests that Mexican women decide whether or not to have an abortion based not on their religion, politics, or socioeconomic status, but rather on their fears that an abortion will hurt or kill them. The main difference for women, said Schiavon, is whether or not they’ve received information that abortion causes breast cancer, infertility, depression, or suicide—exactly the information IRMA is helping to spread around the nation.

“They’ve gotten out the message that abortion is unsafe and dangerous,” Schiavon said. Ironically, she added, “That is the case when it’s illegal.”

When Mexico City’s law changed in 2007, allowing elective abortions in the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, it was a substantial victory for reproductive rights advocates in a country, and a region, where the Catholic Church dominates daily life. Across Latin America, access to legal abortion is a rarity, and in 2007, all eyes turned to Mexico City to see how the experiment would play out—and whether it could be replicated. To date, only Uruguay has followed Mexico City in liberalizing its abortion law, and this June, the world watched as El Salvador denied a lifesaving abortion to a woman known as Beatriz for five months before finally allowing a c-section delivery for the nonviable fetus.

After decriminalization, however, a fierce backlash unfurled across Mexico. In the first three years, half of the country’s 31 provinces passed new constitutional amendments enshrining abortion bans—two of which were just upheld by Mexico’s Supreme Court this May. As a result of the amendments passed after 2007 in 18 Mexican states, women in the provinces are increasingly being prosecuted for “attempted abortion,” often reported by hospital staff when they seek help after self-abortions, unsupervised use of the medical abortion drug misoprostol, or unsafe back-alley terminations.

Regina Tames, a lawyer and executive director of the reproductive rights advocacy group GIRE (Grupo de Información en Reproducción Elegida), worked with several of the dozens of women being prosecuted for attempted abortion in 2012. If convicted, some of these women could face up to six years in jail, while others would be sentenced to fines or community service. Many were already condemned in their communities after newspapers printed their pictures and identified them as criminals and baby killers.

 

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Written by Cynthia R. Greenlee for RH Reality Check. This diary is cross-posted; commenters wishing to engage directly with the author should do so at the original post.

For more than 20 years, the New York Times’ Vows column has shared newly hitched couples’ idiosyncratic paths to marriage. Vows has followed Wall Street wunderkinds down the aisle as well as a flame-throwing bride, a couple who admitted they fell in love while meeting at their children’s pre-K class (and while married to other people), and countless stories about partners whose first meetings did not foreshadow connubial bliss.

In a September 1 Vows column titled “Taking Their Very Sweet Time,” the paper profiled a couple who talked openly about their shared abortion experience. It’s an atypical abortion mention for the Times, where coverage is more likely to focus on state-level efforts to restrict the procedure. And, indeed, it would be rare in most newspapers, where formulaic wedding announcements often contain little more than references to wedding fashion and family trees.

At first glance, the wedding announcement of 32-year-old stay-at-home mom Faith Rein and 33-year-old Miami Heat basketball player Udonis Haslem fits the mold of many Vows columns: a meeting in college, stumbling blocks, and an extended courtship. Athletics helped them bond despite the differences in her suburban upbringing and Haslem’s hardscrabble Miami childhood; she ran track at the University of Florida, while Haslem was a Gators basketball standout.

But in the column written by Linda Marx, Rein and Haslem described the unplanned pregnancy that threatened to derail her junior year, his NBA draft plans, and their educations. Haslem was already a father and said that while “I am not a huge fan of abortion,” they had sports careers to think about and very little money to start a family together. Haslem’s support of Rein solidified their bond. Rein said, “I saw another side of him during that difficult time and fell deeply in love. He had a big heart and was the whole package.”

The announcement’s matter-of-fact tone and the couple’s understanding of their abortion as just one important event in their relationship makes the article remarkable, says Tracy Weitz, a public health professor and director of the University of California, San Francisco’s Advancing New Standards in Reproductive Health (ANSIRH) research group and think tank.

“From my perspective, what is amazing about this story is that the abortion is not the beginning or end of the story—the way we usually tell abortion stories,” she said.

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Written by Amanda Marcotte for RH Reality Check. This diary is cross-posted; commenters wishing to engage directly with the author should do so at the original post.

As part of the struggle to prevent women from using the health-care benefits they earn, six state attorneys general—who clearly need something better to do with their time—launched a suit to give employers the right to deny employees coverage of birth control as part of their health policies. Now, those attorneys general are giving up the lawsuit, for now at least, in no small part because a federal judge earlier ruled they have no standing to sue. What other people do with their own insurance coverage does not, it turns out, cause any actual damage to strangers, making it really hard for these conservative attorneys to argue that they have standing. Ian Millhiser at ThinkProgress explains:

"Standing" is the requirement that a plaintiff show that they have actually been injured by a law before they are allowed to sue to challenge it in federal court. No one, not even a state attorney general acting on behalf of his or her state, is allowed to bring a case to federal court simply because they do not like the law, or because they are able to offer some speculative reason why the law might somehow injure them at some point in the future.

This problem that these attorneys general were facing is a fundamental problem for the anti-choice movement generally: All their beliefs go back to the conviction that what other people, even perfect strangers, are doing in bed somehow affects them and so needs to be stopped by any means necessary. (Sadly, as family planning clinics and abortion clinics can tell you, this sometimes means that criminal and even violent behavior is often a part of the arsenal that anti-choicers use in attacking other people for having sex without their permission.) The problem with this belief is self-evident. What other people are doing with their bodies does not actually affect anti-choicers, and so their standing—not just legally, but morally—is always hard to impossible to establish. Thus, the never-ending parade of bad faith arguments and outright lies that come from anti-choicers.

With their support of abortion bans, there's at least a mild plausibility to their claim to be concerned over fetal life, though of course it crumbles the second you start looking more deeply at the evidence, particularly when it comes to the fact that anti-choicers consistently resist every realistic policy known to reduce the abortion rate because those policies don't actually satisfy their real desire to punish women for having sex. Beyond that, though, they lose the ability to come up with arguments that don't nakedly expose their belief that they are the proper owners of your body.

The contraception mandate battle is a perfect example of this. Unable to come right out and say that they don't want it to be too easy for women to have non-procreative sex, anti-choicers have instead latched onto this "religious freedom for employers" argument. Unfortunately, the argument doesn't work without the assumption that your employer has some ownership over his employee's private life, including her own religious beliefs. The argument rests on the assumption that because your employer has a right to control your compensation after he's released it to you, that even though the insurance plan actually belongs to you and not your employer—because you earned it, alongside your paycheck—he has a right to dictate how you use it. It really is no different than trying to control how you spend your paycheck, but anti-choicers hope the public, confused by the heavily bureaucratic insurance system, won't see that. But if you spend even a few moments thinking about it, it becomes clear that the objection to the contraception mandate is rooted in the belief that your employer has a right to try to impose his religious views on you in the bedroom.

 

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Written by Andrea Grimes for RH Reality Check. This diary is cross-posted; commenters wishing to engage directly with the author should do so at the original post.

There's no evidence that the "feminist army" of orange-clad pro-choice supporters brought containers of urine and feces to the Texas state capitol this summer during debates over an omnibus anti-abortion bill, according to documents released Monday by the Texas Department of Public Safety in response to public information requests sent to the department by media outlets across the state.

The documents do show state troopers relied on unsubstantiated rumors that "orange women" intended to engage in tampon-tossing, poop-throwing, and flashing, as claimed by anti-choice activists on social media in advance of July's vote on HB 2, which imposes onerous restrictions on abortion providers and clinics and bans abortion after 20 weeks in the state.

On the afternoon of July 12, the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) released a statement that said it had "discovered one jar suspected to contain urine, 18 jars suspected to contain feces," three bottles suspected to contain paint, and "significant quantities of feminine hygiene products, glitter and confetti."

But since that press release and in documents released Monday, Texas DPS has been wholly unable to provide evidence of the urine and feces, either photographic or through confirmation from any state trooper, though the department does appear to have photographed a paint canister and three bricks that were "discovered" on July 12.

"I am tired of reading that we made this stuff up," wrote Texas DPS Director Steven McGraw in a July 14 damage control email released with the documents. He continued, "Does anyone realistically believe we would fabricate evidence to support a political agenda. Amazing."

But the intelligence that prompted the DPS to conduct gallery-door searches of bags appears to have come predominantly from one person with a very vocal right-wing political agenda: Abby Johnson, the professional anti-choice activist who once ran an East Texas Planned Parenthood clinic before her religious conversion. The day before the HB 2 debate, Johnson claimed on her Facebook page that "angry, hurting" pro-choice people would be "looking to get into trouble tomorrow" and would be "aggressive."

An individual named Gerardo Gonzalez emailed Johnson's post, along with another Facebook post from an unknown source (he wrote, "I am not sure who posted this") to DPS on the morning of July 12. The unknown poster wrote that "women in orange wearing skirts" had plans to "flash" the gallery and throw blood "on supporters of the bill."

 

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Written by Kenyon Farrow for RH Reality Check. This diary is cross-posted; commenters wishing to engage directly with the author should do so at the original post.

On August 22, the New York City Council voted to override Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s veto of the Community Safety Act, which is composed of two bills seeking to create more levels of accountability within the New York Police Department (NYPD) and prevent discriminatory practices, such as stop-and-frisk activity, from occurring.

The Community Safety Act was passed one week after Judge Shira A. Scheindlin declared, in Floyd v. The City of New York, that the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk program is unconstitutional because it violates the Fourth Amendment. While we should be pleased a court ruled against the department's stop-and-frisk policy—which is said to have violated the constitutional rights of many thousands of people, almost all of them Black and Latinowith the vast majority of them not found to have violated any crime—the ruling did not go far enough to ensure people in New York are protected from being unduly harassed and violated.

But the Community Safety Act actually gives some teeth to Judge Scheindlin’s decision, and speaks to the need for community organizing to drive policy and ensure its enforcement.

In her decision, Judge Scheindlin ruled on behalf of the plaintiffs represented in the stop-and-frisk case, arguing:

[F]irst, plaintiffs showed that senior officials in the City and at the NYPD were deliberately indifferent to officers conducting unconstitutional stops and frisks; and second, plaintiffs showed that practices resulting in unconstitutional stops and frisks were sufficiently widespread that they had the force of law.

In order to be able to use the stop-and-frisk tactic in ways that are lawful, Judge Scheindlin ordered the city to bring on a federal monitor to oversee reforms, change the way stops are documented, and institute a year-long pilot program through which officers must wear cameras to record their interactions.

While many in the press declared the judge’s decision an end to stop and frisk, her decision stopped short of a full-on repeal. As long as the NYPD doesn’t use race as a blanket reason for stops, the tactic can move forward.

 

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